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Is E.P. Thompson (1924–1993) still a relevant resource for the left? The two
books under review—one a collection of  his occasional pieces and the other an
intellectual biography—would like to leave the reader with a positive impression.
To be sure, British sociology is still strongly influenced by the tradition of  “cul-
tural studies” to which Thompson was a distinguished early contributor, and
there have been periodic efforts to keep his memory alive, typically as someone
who was sensitive to the moral dimension of  political economy.2 Here he is often
coupled with Karl Polanyi, the émigré Austrian lawyer turned economic historian.
Polanyi’s 1944 masterwork The Great Transformation is now regarded as a founding
text in economic anthropology. It remains a contemporary reference point for
those who prefer to see their socialism grounded in a communitarian rather than
a technocratic ethos.3
What unites Polanyi and Thompson, a literary scholar by training, is an
intuition that there was a window of  opportunity in the eighteenth century for an
escape from feudalism that did not involve an embrace of  capitalism.4 Indeed,
not only is most of  Thompson’s historical scholarship—from The Making of  the
English Working Class (1963) to Customs in Common (1991)—about this period, but
it is also the source of  his examples for the sort of  grassroots “socialist human-
ism” that he favoured. But whereas Polanyi—notwithstanding his emphasis on
the redistribution of  surplus (agricultural) wealth—remained largely immune to
Marx’s charms, Thompson explicitly adopted the ideas and rhetorical trappings of
Marxism. Yet the fact that so much of  his work is devoted to distancing himself
from the more “orthodox,” “materialist,” “structuralist” versions of  Marxism
prominent in the twentieth century—notably in The Poverty of  Theory (1978)—
could lead the ungenerous reader to conclude that Thompson never quite figured
out something that Polanyi realized relatively early in his career, namely, that while
he was a kind of  socialist, he was not really a Marxist—or even a progressive.
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Polanyi was a somewhat errant offspring of  the Austrian school of  eco-
nomics who nevertheless shared their understanding of  Marxism as a “commu-
nised” version of  Saint-Simon’s socially engineered capitalism. To the Austrians,
Marx simply transferred the reins of  the scientifically planned economy from the
“captains of  industry” and their expert advisers to the proletarian foot soldiers,
but the fundamentally autocratic sensibility remained intact.5 Here it is worth not-
ing that the Austrians understood Marx as very much the originator of  what
came to be known as “Marxism”. In other words, they placed less emphasis on
Marx’s own intellectual biography—e.g. his “Hegelian” roots in the phenomenol-
ogy of  the master-slave relation—than on the political formations that Marx pro-
moted once he moved to Paris and then London, which were extended by his
followers in various “International” conferences. Thus, the Austrians see a clear
red thread running from Marx to the Soviet Union. This is in contrast to Thomp-
son’s understanding of  Marx, which perhaps became the norm in the English-
speaking world in the 1960s, whereby “authentic Marxism” was judged by its
conformity to the spirit of  Marx’s early work, prior to his serious involvement in
organizing the political movement that came to bear his name. From this oppos-
ing standpoint, the Soviet Union is increasingly seen as betraying Marx’s original
principles. 
Based on Polanyi’s reading, Marx would seem to be a strange bedfellow
for someone like Thompson, who agreed with Polanyi that a symbiotic relation-
ship to nature was a key feature of  anything that might be called “socialist hu-
manism.” After all, Marx had adapted Saint-Simon’s account of  the transition
from military to commercial societies under organized capitalism into an account
of  human progress from the mutual exploitation of  humans (shared by military
and commercial societies, or feudalism and capitalism, in Marx’s view) to human-
ity’s collective exploitation of  nature (true socialism). Marx appeared to share a
belief  held not only by Saint-Simon and his followers but also by classical politi-
cal economists—namely, that the true enemy of  humanity is not some part of  the
human population (say, a repressive or a backward class) but nature itself, whose
inherent scarcity places limits on the full development of  human potential. 
As a result, human ingenuity needs to be organized to overcome
scarcity. This is what Saint-Simon meant by “industry,” and the phrase “Industrial
Revolution” was coined to capture this idea as a generalised mentality, which of
course Marx shared. For Saint-Simon, nature’s scarcity, and its hostility to the re-
alization of  human ends, is the modern mark of  our Biblically fallen state, the re-
sult of  our divine expulsion from the superabundance of  the Garden of  Eden. In
Marx’s more explicitly secular philosophical anthropology, “primitive commu-
nism” corresponds to Eden. But for both Saint-Simon and Marx, this original pe-
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riod is not one in which humans lived modestly in harmony with nature, say, in
the sense that was promoted in recent years under the rubric of  “social ecology”
by the anarchist Murray Bookchin, a position with which both Polanyi and
Thompson could have some considerable sympathy.6 Rather, in our pre-lapsarian
state, nature was directly responsive to humanity’s godlike will, starting with
Adam’s naming of  the creatures. 
Again, for both Saint-Simon and Marx, “industry” was the road to re-
demption, as it tapped into our godlike ability to make more out of  less through
the application of  intelligent labour, and thereby come to approximate that
Edenic state of  nature’s automatic responsiveness to Adam’s command. Where
Saint-Simon and Marx parted company was that the former believed that industry
required a hierarchical organization of  human labour, a rationalization of  capital-
ism’s dominant tendency, which had been codified by the classical political econo-
mists. In contrast, Marx believed that capitalism’s retention of  the repressive
character of  hierarchy from feudalism was itself  part of  the problem, especially if
one believes that all humans have this godlike capacity for “industry.” But for
both, nature is presumed to be the ultimate foe that turns my enemy’s enemy into
my friend, effectively resolving class conflict into collective progress.
In short, what Polanyi early understood and what Thompson perhaps
never quite appreciated was that Marx was more “post-capitalist” than “anti-capi-
talist” in his orientation to political economy. In other words, like Saint-Simon,
Marx saw capitalism as not only part of  history’s forward momentum but also the
platform for launching the next stage of  human progress. Where they differed
was over the features of  capitalism that had to be retained and abandoned in the
move to socialism. From Marx’s standpoint, Saint-Simon’s vision retained too
much of  the emerging capitalism of  his day—and so remained too indebted to
past social formations—to be a reliable guide to the future. In this context, it was
telling that Saint-Simon’s fondness for hierarchy was matched by a fondness for
Christianity, especially as this combination was continued by his student, Auguste
Comte. Indeed, this struggle between Marxists and those who after Comte came
to be known as “positivists” over how to transcend capitalism has arguably an-
chored the left’s soul-searching about what it means to be ”progressive” since the
mid-nineteenth century.  
For his part, Polanyi realized in a way that Thompson never did that his
own vision of  “socialist humanism” was distinctly pre-capitalist in orientation, re-
ferring to a world in which the differences between Saint-Simon and Marx never
would have mattered. In this pre-capitalist utopia, the state would never have con-
solidated society on so many levels, especially by integrating individuals by means
of  functional differentiation, instead of  allowing for their own relatively sponta-
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neous modes of  self-organization. Such a resolutely anti-statist stance helps to ex-
plain why Polanyi refrained from intervening in contemporary political debates,
contenting himself  with searching for cross-cultural precedents for economies
with a strong mutualist and redistributionist ethic. In contrast, the less self-aware
Thompson found himself  rather quixotically at odds with both the Marxists and
the positivists of  his day—the latter represented by Anthony Crosland, the intel-
lectual leader of  the Gaitskellite wing of  the UK Labour Party whose techno-
cratic-cum-meritocratic vision of  the welfare state fuelled by a “mixed economy”
dominated post-war mainstream British political discourse. I shall conclude by
saying more about this less talked about side of  Thompson’s ideological polemics. 
One reason to believe that Thompson is of  little use to the modern left
is that he was not so clearly a “progressive” thinker in the sense that both Saint-
Simon and Marx were. Close attention to Thompson’s public writing and speak-
ing reveals someone who, like C. Wright Mills (with whom he corresponded and
whose obituary he wrote) and Noam Chomsky, saw big government and big busi-
ness in cahoots to thwart the freedom of  the individual. In a remarkable un-
scripted talk for the UK Channel 4 late-night television programme Opinions,
Thompson proposed that these superordinate entities have conspired to turn in-
tellectuals into media mouthpieces, marginalizing anyone who would ask funda-
mental questions about the course of  domestic or foreign policy (the talk was
given in 1982, the year of  the Falklands War). By way of  contrast, Thompson
pointed to the pamphleteers, poets, and dissenters who, in his telling, occupied
centre stage in eighteenth century public life. As for what can be done today,
Thompson concluded that there needs to be a platform for citizens worldwide to
voice conscientious objection to the policies pursued by their respective nation-
states. On first hearing, this sounds like a role for the United Nations, were it not
that the UN accepts the legitimacy of  nation-states in a way that Thompson obvi-
ously did not.7
As this episode illustrates, Thompson identified public intellectual life
with the politics of  protest, through which he then forged a link between the
eighteenth and twentieth centuries. And while protest has certainly been a com-
ponent of  progressive politics, there is nothing inherently progressive about
protesting. Protest in the first instance is simply an expression of  resistance to the
status quo or dominant tendency, it is confrontational but falls short of  being
progressive. Progress also requires a direction of  travel away from the source of
confrontation that effectively overcomes it, so that one does not need to en-
counter it again—or at least not in the same virulent guise. This was what Marx
learned from Hegel’s Aufheben, the synthetic moment of  the dialectic. More gen-
erally, we might say that progress had to be invented or learned in human history,
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given that most world cultures account for temporal change in cyclical terms. In
other words, the foe against whom we protest never truly disappears. However,
progressives believe that the foe can be defeated once and for all. This explains
the campaigns to “eliminate” or “eradicate” disease, famine, poverty, illiteracy, etc.
that have been done in the name of  progressives on both the positivist and the
Marxist side of  the left for the past 150 years. It also explains the enormous dis-
appointment and, increasingly, cynicism and backlash when these efforts fail to
meet their targets. 
It is against this backdrop that we should consider Christos Efstathiou’s
sympathetic attempt—published by a small London press that provided a base
for Thompson himself  and other “new left” luminaries—to explain Thompson’s
curious political trajectory. Efstathiou boils it down to Thompson’s support for
the “Popular Front,” the name used for a coalition of  working and middle class
people who opposed Fascism in various European countries in the 1930s. How-
ever, the coalition was not “progressive” in the sense of  offering a collective proj-
ect that would be made possible once Fascism was vanquished. Indeed, as might
be expected of  a cross-class alliance, it did not really possess a positive ideology.
It was a case of  “my enemy’s enemy is my friend,” but without taking advantage
of  the opportunity to forge a deeper unity of  purpose. To be sure, much of  this
lack of  progressive telos can be explained by the Popular Front’s belief  that Fas-
cism was an ever-present threat, no matter the resistance. But in the case of
Thompson, there is also a more fundamental belief, a social ontology that he
shared with his eighteenth-century heroes which is not so different from
Polanyi’s: namely, that when people are freed from repressive regimes they can
self-organize to promote their collective interests. They do not need to be led in a
particular direction by those who know better. They simply need to be allowed to
know for themselves and then act accordingly. 
However, modern ideological politics, both of  the “left” and the “right,”
are about setting a direction of  collective travel in time.8 In this respect, it is a bit
surprising that given his reputation as a historian who attended to the contextual
details of  his subjects, Thompson never seemed to take seriously that the modern
left/right ideological polarity is a product of  the aftermath of  the French Revolu-
tion, the period immediately following the one to which he devoted most of  his re-
search. The left/right polarity formed over the extent to which past (political,
economic, cultural, etc.) practice should be carried over into the future. As we
saw with Saint Simon and Marx, the left wanted to replace large chunks of  past
practice with more “progressive” alternatives. It is not at all clear that the eigh-
teenth-century protesters on which Thompson modelled his own practice were
temporally oriented in quite this way. Thompson’s awkwardness with regard to
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the “progressive” character of  leftist politics has been inherited by his second
generation “new left” followers who now largely populate the academy in pro-
grammes that promote “cultural studies” and “identity politics.” 
Here it is instructive to recall how Thompson ends his masterwork, The
Making of  the English Working Class, in a chapter entitled “Class Consciousness.”
Had it been written by a “progressive” Marxist, it would have been focused on
how working class people organized to overcome class difference. Thompson,
however, focuses on how working class people forced their “betters” to acknowl-
edge their existence without necessarily reducing any of  the inequalities between
them. As Thompson argues, it was more about the politics of  recognition than
the politics of  equality which were being promoted across the Channel in France.
This perspective is confirmed by Thompson’s interesting but relatively neglected
Whigs and Hunters (1975), which uses the Black Act of  1723 as an entry point to
discuss the emergence of  the “rule of  law” in Britain. It focuses on legislation
which for the following century made poaching a capital crime. While the long
struggle for the Black Act’s repeal did not remove the underlying economic dif-
ferences between the landowners and the poachers, it marked a newfound respect
for human life. This was reflected in the mutual accountability of  the owners and
the poachers under the eyes of  the law, such that the former came to be restricted
in how they could mete out justice to the latter. The overall picture that emerges
is one in which basic inequality at the material level in never really redressed. In-
stead there is a stabilization of  the social order through the legitimation of  differ-
ent ways of  being in the world. Thus, the lives of  workers slowly come to be seen
to possess a kind of  intrinsic dignity that went beyond whatever services the
workers provided for their masters and employers. 
The birth pangs of  cultural studies and identity politics are easy to spot
in the type of  narrative trajectory illustrated in Whigs and Hunters, including
Thompson’s allergic reaction to historical materialism in its more economistic
forms. However, from a “progressive” standpoint, Thompson’s narrative looks
relatively nostalgic, unambitious, and perhaps even conservative in orientation.
After all, neither Saint-Simon nor Marx thought that the main problem with the
workers was their poverty or their lack of  recognition. Rather, it was the lack of
organization which is required to bring about effective change in an entire society.
Yet, as Cal Winslow makes clear in the introduction to Thompson’s occasional
pieces, Thompson was loath to turn such a critical eye on the working class.
Winslow traces this attitude to a 1950 paper, “Against University Standards,” in
which Thompson objected to the invocation of  John Henry Newman in the mis-
sion statement of  the adult education programme in which he taught. He specifi-
cally complained about Newman’s emphasis on education’s role in inculcating an
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attitude of  tolerance, which Thompson read as an invitation for students to park
their lived experience outside the classroom. On the contrary, Thompson in-
sisted, education should amplify students’ powers of  self-expression, not to miti-
gate or otherwise “reform” them. This especially applied to the education of
workers, who already faced so many challenges to their self-worth by the merito-
cratic culture of  post-war Britain.9
This is a convenient point to turn to what is perhaps the strongest indi-
cation of  the anti-progressive character of  Thompson’s socialist humanism—
namely, his regularly voiced contempt for the “socialist revisionism” of  the UK
Labour Party, or “Gaitskellism,” as Thompson sometimes called it, after Hugh
Gaitskell, Chancellor of  the Exchequer in the early years of  the welfare state and
Labour Party leader until his untimely death in 1963.10 However, Thompson’s
most explicit target was one of  Gaitskell’s protégés, Anthony Crosland, arguably
the Labour Party’s leading post-war intellectual, who died in 1977 as Foreign Sec-
retary under James Callaghan, the last Labour prime minister until Tony Blair.11
To understand why Thompson often expressed greater antipathy to the revision-
ists than to the Stalinists, we need to keep in mind that just like his contemporary
Tony Benn and Benn’s acolyte, current Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn,
Thompson believed that throughout its history the party had too easily sold out
its “socialist” principles for short-term electoral advantage. In contrast, they all
believed that the Soviet Union—even at its most repressive domestically and
menacing internationally—was simply responding to the ratcheting up of  Cold
War rhetoric by the United States.12
However, Thompson, Benn and Corbyn may be guilty of  projecting a
nostalgic view of  the Labour Party as having been a grassroots people’s move-
ment, which it never was. On the contrary, with the exception of  Michael Foot’s
ill-fated party leadership in early 1980s and Corbyn’s more successful leadership
today, the Labour Party has always been in the hands of  people who were clearly
following in the footsteps of  the party’s founders in the Fabian movement, an
offshoot of  the Liberal Party that was dedicated to unleashing society’s produc-
tive forces by long-term systematic reform of  the mechanisms of  government—
and the dispositions of  the governed. What leftists often derided in Blair’s
so-called “New Labour” years as “aspirationalism” had been always central to the
Labour Party’s ideological mission.13
Nevertheless, these leftists can claim Thompson as a progenitor, who
nearly four decades earlier had targeted Crosland as promoting a “myth of  pros-
perity,” “Americanisation,” and “philistinism.”14 What Thompson found most
galling in Crosland’s revisionism was the very drive for “upward social mobility,”
which would have members of  the working class abandon their roots and strive
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to become part of  the middle class. In Crosland’s revised socialism, people are
never good enough as they are, and so they need the state to create the conditions
for bettering themselves. This invariably results in people producing and consum-
ing more. The task of  government is to enable all this to happen as efficiently as
possible, which entails human capital investments to smarten up the population
as well as strategic decisions about which welfare functions are best done directly
by the state, as opposed to state-regulated markets. 
Curiously, for someone who believed in the native wit of  the working
class and was generally averse to top-down social explanations, Thompson was
firmly convinced that Crosland-style state-based engineering of  human aspira-
tions instilled a false consciousness in the general public. The lure of  a consumer
society effectively inhibited them from questioning as loudly as they should the
need for ever greater productivity. For his part, Crosland would probably find
Thompson’s attitude rather patronizing of  the public, who once presented with
options for “better living,” might well decide to relinquish their old class and cul-
tural affiliations and adopt new ones. In the end, we see here a fundamental con-
flict that the left has faced vis-à-vis its attitude towards freedom. Thompson
ultimately believed that people should have the freedom to be who they are, a
rather classical conception of  freedom, which harks to the days of  natural law
and natural rights. In contrast, the more modern Crosland held that people
should have the freedom to be who they want to be, which may be something
other than who they are, which in turn alludes to a world of  contract and ex-
change. Thompson’s difficulties in fully reconciling himself  to various doctrines
of  progressive politics, including Marxism, stems from the pre-modern political
sensibility that he retained from his eighteenth-century heroes. These difficulties,
though not as explicitly expressed as in Thompson’s work, have been largely in-
herited by the vexed leftism of  contemporary cultural studies and identity politics.
It perhaps also explains why the two books under review, while clearly sympa-
thetic to Thompson, treat him as a closed chapter in the history of  leftist
thought.
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1 This piece is dedicated to my Warwick colleague Charles Turner, who intro-
duced me to Thompson’s Whigs and Hunters, at which point the penny dropped.
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11–27.
3 E.g. Tim Rogan, The Moral Economists: R.H. Tawney, Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson
and the Critique of  Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018). Al-
though there is no clear evidence that Polanyi influenced Thompson, many of
Thompson’s more incisive observations about classical political economy have a
Polanyiesque feel. For example, Thompson notes that Adam Smith and Thomas
Malthus naturalized agricultural shortfalls, as if  resources could not be redistrib-
uted to mitigate their effects on the poor, as in “primitive communist” societies.
For good measure, he draws on Amartya Sen’s thesis that famines result when
rent-seeking elites  take the same cut of  the product during a moderate shortfall
in production, resulting in an exceptional shortfall. See E.P. Thompson, Customs
in Common (London: Merlin Press, 1991), 284–7.  
4 In both cases, it is a “long eighteenth century,” since both Polanyi and Thomp-
son’s main works roam into the first third of  the nineteenth century. In Thomp-
son’s case, this means that he sees the immediate aftermath of  the French
Revolution, not as the start of  the modern ideological struggle over the role of
an increasingly powerful state but as a continuation of  the popular movements of
the previous century, which culminated in the passage of  the Great Reform Bill
of  1832, whereby for the first time Parliamentary constituencies were allotted by
population size. 
5 This is a major thesis of  Friedrich Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of  Science
(Chicago: University of  Chicago, 1952).
6 Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of  Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of  Hierar-
chy (Palo Alto: Cheshire Books, 1982).
7 E.P. Thompson, “Opinion 1982,” YouTube,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DGhWxFj3SZo.
8 Steve Fuller and Veronika Lipinska, The Proactionary Imperative (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014), chap. 1.
9 E.P. Thompsom, Cal Winslow, eds., E.P. Thompson and the Making of  the New Left
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 2014), 18–19.
10 Thompson’s visceral dislike of  Gaitskellism may relate to Gaitskell’s undergrad-
uate thesis at Oxford, written under the supervision of  G.D.H. Cole, which made
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the very un-Thompson-like argument that the UK Chartist movement—which
eventually secured voting rights for working class men in the Great Reform Bill
of  1867—required middle class leadership for its success. 
11 Crosland’s revisionist magnum opus is The Future of  Socialism (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1956).
12 Thompson explicitly argues this point in a 1984 Oxford Union debate against
Reagan’s Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger. The motion on the table was that
the US and USSR are moral equivalents, which Thompson affirmed. See Harbor-
Side Films, “Great Confrontations at the Oxford Union: Caspar Weinberger vs.
E.P. Thompson,” YouTube,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMdTJJa3kVo. 
13 Chris Renwick, Bread for All: The Origins of  the Welfare State (London: Allen Lane,
2017).
14 E.P. Thompson and the Making of  the New Left, 28–29, 85–87.
